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Giving consumers a stronger voice 
Q1. How can we enhance these models and strengthen the role of stakeholders in providing 
input and challenge to company plans? 
We support the principle that network licensees should engage closely with their 
stakeholders and deliver customer requirements, whilst also taking into account the views of 
other parties affected by the gas and electricity networks.  
Through RIIO-1, network licensees have been encouraged to engage with stakeholders and, 
as far as we are aware, they have1. However, the quality of that engagement varies and we 
are unclear what impact this has had on business planning. At present, the strongest driver 
for engagement with stakeholders arises when network companies are seeking planning 
permission for network reinforcement rather than through RIIO or any other aspect of the 
regulatory environment. Forums for customers to share their views about, for example, 
connection processes and charging arrangements provide another important means for 
stakeholder engagement. Stakeholders also take part in panels concerned with reviews of 
codes, e.g. Grid Code, Connection and Use of System Code. It has been argued by some that 
ƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĨŽƌĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĨŝƚŶĞƐƐĨŽƌƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨƵůů
suite of relevant codes is no longer adequate2 although precisely how they can be improved 
is open to question. In our view (a) proposed code modifications are not always brought 
forward in a timely manner and (b) some stakeholders sometimes take a very parochial view, 
objecting to changes that, at the very least, delay their implementation3. 
Other forms of engagement of which we are aware include more general events to which 
almost anyone is welcome and at which the network licensees give high level presentations 
on recent work and forthcoming priorities.  
Aside from the impact of planning applications, we are unclear what impact ůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ?ĚŝƌĞĐƚ
ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŚĂƐŚĂĚƚŽĚĂƚĞŽŶŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ? business processes and 
planning. It is unclear whether capital expenditure plans have been changed as a result 
except, for example, in measures to reduce the visual impact of network developments. In 
spite of improvements (Ğ ?Ő ?ŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŚĞĂƚŵĂƉƐ ?ŽĨĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ
opportunities) distribution network operators (DNOs), in particular, still seem to face criticism 
in respect of connection processes, the provision of information and the sharing of risk4.  
Ofgem ?ƐƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽďĞ oriented towards the 
determination of a price control settlement. This will help ensure that stakeholders are 
                                                     
1 See for example: SP Energy Networks. (2018). Engagement. 
https://www.spenergynetworks.co.uk/pages/stakeholder_engagement.aspx [May 2nd, 2018]; and 
National Grid. (2018). Stakeholder Engagement. http://www.talkingnetworkstx.com/stakeholder-
engagement.aspx [May 2nd, 2018] 
2 See Energy System Catapult, Future Power System Architecture, August 2017. 
3 See for example: National Grid. (2018). Grid Code. 
https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/codes/grid-code?meeting-docs  [May 2nd, 2018] 
4 For some discussion, see, for example, Bell, K. and Gill, S. (2018) Delivering a highly distributed 
electricity system: Technical, regulatory and policy challenges. Energy Policy 113: 765-777. 
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drawn into the price control process and have the chance to reflect on plans in a considered 
and informed way. If successful then ƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŚƌĞĞƐƚĂŐĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ?ŝ ? “ƵƐĞƌŐƌŽƵƉƐ ?
for the transmission licensees5 Žƌ “ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƵƐƚŽŵĞƌŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ'ƌŽƵƉƐ ?ĨŽƌ
ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŝ ?Ă “ŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ'ƌŽƵƉ ?ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚďǇKĨŐĞŵĂŶĚ ?ŝŝŝ ? “KƉĞŶ,ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚ
provide additional insights into whether proposed expenditures are needed. They may also 
provide information that complements analyses commissioned by Ofgem about costs.  
One concern expressed ĂƚKĨŐĞŵ ?Ɛ “dŚĞ&ƵƚƵƌĞŽĨEĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŝŶ'ůĂƐŐŽǁŽŶƉƌŝů ? ?th 
2018 was that stakeholder groups, presented with plans that make extensive use of highly 
innovative methods or technologies, would prefer something more conservative. On the 
other hand, a stakeholder group might naturally want a plan with a lower total cost.  
We are pleased to note that Ofgem recognises the need for stakeholder engagement groups 
to have access to expert support. We also note that stakeholders need to make significant 
commitments of time to attend consultative meetings and review documents. Ofgem 
proposes that the individuals or organisations concerned should be compensated for their 
time, though, in the case of licensee user or Customer Engagement groups, this might also 
change the level of independence that the stakeholders feel, or are perceived to have, with 
respect to the network licensee. 'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ'ƌŽƵƉĂŶĚ ‘ŽƉĞŶ
ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ ?, the added value of user groups or Customer Engagement Groups to the price 
control process might therefore be questioned. In addition, we wonder about the extent to 
which these groups, the Challenge Group or Ofgem may be expected to be pro-active in 
proposing additional expenditure, e.g. to safeguard against cyber security risks.  
- What are your views on the proposal to have Open Hearings on areas of contention 
that have been identified by the Groups? 
One major question we have about the 3 level process outlined by Ofgem is whether it can 
be implemented - the groups formed and considered, informed views reached - by the time 
Ofgem is required to define allowed revenues and revenue adjustment mechanisms for the 
RIIO-2 period. How does Ofgem envisage their role during the RIIO-2 period and before RIIO-
3? Perhaps their constitution as part of the RIIO-2 settlement process should be treated as a 
trial informing some better developed process for RIIO-3. 
Responding to how networks are used 
Length of price control 
Q2. Do you agree with our preferred position to set the price control for a five-year period, but 
with the flexibility to set some allowances over a longer period, if companies can present a 
compelling justification, such as on innovation or efficiency grounds? 
- What type of cost categories should be set over a longer period? 
                                                     
5 Some form of which should have been happening in the RIIO-1 period anyway. We would welcome 
any evidence that Ofgem can provide that existing stakeholder groups have made any difference to 
ƚŚĞůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ?ĂůůŽǁĞĚƌĞǀĞŶƵĞƐŽƌƉůĂŶƐ ? 
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- How could we mitigate the potential disruption this might cause to the rest of the 
framework? 
- What additional measures might be required to support longer-term thinking among 
network companies? 
- Do you instead support the option of retaining eight-year price controls with a more 
extensive Mid-Period Review (MPR)? 
- What impact might the alternative option of an eight-year price control with a more 
extensive MPR have on how network companies plan and operate their businesses? 
The main advantage of a long price control period is to provide an incentive to the licensees 
to innovate. If licensees invest in innovation in the early part of the period, they have time to 
earn a return on this, by lowering the cost of delivering a service to their customers and 
meeting licence conditions at a lower cost than was assumed in the price control settlement. 
Only under such circumstances might shareholders be expected to put their money at risk in 
the pursuit of innovative methods and technologies. 
However, long price control periods also have significant disadvantages. Given the speed of 
change in the electricity sector, shorter periods with significant flexibility will allow income to 
be adjusted as the energy system evolves. This is illustrated by the experience of RIIO-1. The 
various factors that, with the benefit of hindsight, led to a number of commentators (Dieter 
Helm, Citizens Advice and Centrica) arguing that network licensee profits were excessive, 
could not have been known with any confidence at the times of the RIIO-1 settlements. 
These include the number, size and location of new connections, demand growth, and asset 
procurement and commissioning costs. Procurement and commissioning costs depend on 
many aspects of the supply chain in respect of both equipment  W in turn affected by the state 
of the world market, commodity prices and exchange rates. They also depend on 
employment costs for staff, which may be affected by economic conditions in Britain and 
elsewhere. Brexit introduces additional uncertainties to this wider economic backdrop.   
dŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ůong-ƚĞƌŵƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĂƚƚĂŬĞƐĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ
ĞŶĞƌŐǇƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŝůůďĞŽĨŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŝŶĚĞĐĂƌďŽŶŝƐŝŶŐƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛenergy system in a 
secure and affordable way. To a large extent, this depends in (a) understanding the potential 
medium to long-term energy system pathways, including key uncertainties6; and (b) the 
identification of least regret investments that, while attracting an option cost, enable the 
future to be adapted to as factors exogenous to the energy networks develop and 
uncertainties are resolved. The latter also requires identification of the times by which key 
decisions should be taken. 
We discuss potential barriers to long-term thinking in our answer to Q3 below but note here 
that, while foresight is important, it is not clear who should be responsible for this  W 
especially given the separation between not just between distribution and transmission but 
also between transmission system operator and transmission owner. We discuss this further 
in our answer to Q6. 
                                                     
6 See, for example, Watson, J., Ketsopoulou, I., Winskel, M. and Gross, R. (2015) The impact of 
uncertainties on the UK's medium-term climate change targets. Energy Policy 87: 685-695 
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Whole system outcomes 
Q3. In what ways can the price control framework be an effective enabler or barrier to the 
delivery of whole system outcomes? 
- If there are barriers, how do you think these can be removed? 
- What elements of the price control should we prioritise to enable whole system 
outcomes? 
Influences on load-related investments 
As we discussed above, the price control framework  W the setting of income allowances over 
a given period of time in order to allow the recovery of reasonable capital expenditure and 
operational costs, and any mechanisms that change income  W is a major influence on network 
licensee behaviour, but so are a number of other things. For example, the importance of 
ĐŽĚĞƐĂŶĚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŝŶĚƌŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ?ĐĂƉŝƚĂůĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƉůĂŶƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞ
underestimated. The network design standards for electricity  W relevant chapters of the 
Security and Quality of Supply Standard (SQSS) and Engineering Recommendation P2  W are 
obvious, fundamental drivers in respect of load-related expenditure. So too, however, are 
provisions in respect of the sharing of information between DNOs and the transmission 
licensees and the monitoring and control of distributed connected equipment. These are 
primarily determined by the Grid Code and, if a transmission licensee/DNO is unaware of 
most cost-effective ways of meeting a need using distributed resources, they will end up 
spending more than is necessary. 
Arrangements for the procurement of balancing services are also important. These include: 
the correction of energy transaction imbalances in individual settlement periods; the buying 
of additional energy at particular locations to ensure that network import constraints are 
respected or, in effect, the buying back of access when there are export constraints; and the 
purchase of other services outside the energy market to enable system operation, i.e. 
ancillary services. With the exception, to date, of the purchase of energy at particular 
locations to respect import constraints, services such as these bought from distributed 
energy resources (DER), i.e. generation, storage or flexible demand connected to a 
distribution network, are of increasing importance to the whole electricity system. For 
example, inflexible DER is beginning to impose additional costs on operation of the 
transmission systems, e.g. in sunny, low demand conditions in the summer. On the other 
hand flexible, schedulable DER might also offer cost-effective alternatives to transmission 
connected resources. 
Responsibilities for asset-based and operational measures 
For the longer term, an economic and sufficiently reliable electricity system depends on an 
adequate balance between the buying of balancing services  W operational measures  W and 
their cost, and asset-based interventions such as the installation of new network facilities.  
RIIO-2 takes place against a changing background in respect of institutional arrangements for 
the procurement of balancing services and investments in new network facilities described 
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elsewhere7  W principally the separation of the electricity system operator from transmission 
owner.  
There are important information-related differences between the ^K ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
TOs and with the DNOs: 
x The SO has a detailed electrical model of the existing and planned transmission 
networks and ĨŽƌŵĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐƵŶĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ůŽĂĚ-ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ?ƚƌĂŶƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
network investment can be flagged: the new connection process under which 
transmission connection applications are made to the SO; and the NOA process. 
x The SO currently possesses only quite poor information on the distribution networks 
and how they are operated. 
In both instances, the SO might wish for a TO or a DNO to carry out some investment in new 
facilities in order to reduce the total cost of balancing services, but it cannot oblige it. In 
addition, although ƚŚĞ^KŚĂƐĂŶĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞdKƐ ?ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?ŝƚůĂĐŬƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
on the condition of existing assets or the local geography that are important inputs to the 
evaluation of options to meet a new network capacity need. The SO therefore depends on 
the TO for economically efficient delivery of new capacity. On the other hand, the TOs are 
now being required to develop capex plans for the RIIO-2 period with only limited 
information from the SO. As we noted in our answer to Q1, capital expenditure planning is 
subject to significant uncertainty; each of the network licensees will be making their own 
forecasts of credible generation developments  W openings and closures  W and demand 
growth. These need to concern the whole electricity system as what happens on the 
distribution networks affects what transmission is required and neighbouring transmission 
networks interact with each other. There is a similar need for consideration across scales for 
gas network planning. As heat and transport begin to be decarbonised, network owners must 
take account of the whole energy system. 
It is our understanding that some of the tensions that may be expected to arise from the split 
between TO and SO are already showing themselves, for example: 
x The electricity SO (ESO) would like to have access to quite comprehensive, reliable 
phasor measurement unit (PMU) data in order to help with characterisation of, 
among other things, system inertia but the provision of PMUs and the associated 
communication infrastructure depends on the TO which, in England and Wales, has 
not yet brought forward the associated investments. 
x The E^KĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽƐƉĞŶĚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƐƵŵƐŽŶĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ‘ŝŶ
ƚŚĞůĞĂĚ ?ĂŶĚĂďƐŽƌďĞǆĐĞƐƐƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌƵŶĚĞƌůŽǁƚƌĂŶƐmission demand 
conditions. It may generally be expected that it would be economic for shunt reactors 
to be installed at key locations to address the problem and reduce dependency on 
 ‘ŽƵƚŽĨŵĞƌŝƚ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂĐŽƐƚĂůůŽǁĂŶĐĞĨŽƌƐƵĐŚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŚad not 
been included in the last price control and the England and Wales TO sought extra 
                                                     
7 See for example: Ofgem. (2017). Future arrangements for the electricity system operator: 
its role and structure. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/future-
arrangements-electricity-system-operator-its-role-and-structure [May, 2nd, 2018]  
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income to pay for it. Ofgem judged that the TO had failed to adequately make the 
case and, hence, did not allow extra income. Although the TO might still have made 
the investment, our understanding is that it chose not to. 
/ŶƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝĨ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚĂŶƐǁĞƌ ?ŝŶƌĞƐƉĐƚŽĨůŝĐĞŶĐĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐǁĂƐƚŽŝŶƐƚĂůůƚŚĞ
shunt reactors, does a failure to do so imply a breach of licence? Presumably, in this case, the 
TO would be in breach as it had failed to deliver the required assets. However, what is the 
materiality of their failure: failure to install the assets; or failure to persuade Ofgem that the 
investment was economic and efficient and, hence, that it was reasonable for the additional, 
previously unforeseen capex, to be recovered via additional income? To what extent  W if any 
 W was failure to make the case a consequence of inadequate information from the SO, and 
how much of that was a consequence of a strict interpretation of the data confidentiality 
provisions of the Electricity Act 1989? Or, has Ofgem simply made a poor judgement that is 
ŶŽƚŝŶĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?
tĞĚŽŶŽƚŽĨĨĞƌĂǀŝĞǁŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚĂŶƐǁĞƌ ?ďƵƚŽĨĨĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐƚŽŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞ
tensions created by the new arrangements. The tensions and difficulties may be contrasted 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ƚŽƚĞǆ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĨŽƌĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝŶZ//K-1 under which a single party 
 W the DNO  W has access to information regarding both asset-based solutions and operational 
measures and has an incentive to choose that with the least cost. However, in respect of 
distribution network investments that would benefit whole system operation, problems re-
emerge. 
It may be supposed that one solution to the apparent disconnection between SO need and 
network owner delivery would be for the SO to have a stronger role in commissioning work. 
For one thing, it may also be supposed that the SO, because they do not own the assets, 
would have no incentive simply to make the asset base as large as possible8. However, 
system operation would be enhanced  W and, in general, made much easier  W by having 
plentiful network capacity. Might there still be an incentive for the SO to over-specify? 
Interactions between electricity transmission and distribution 
We are pleased to note that the Open Networks project is addressing interactions between 
transmission and distribution, and between the respective network licensees. In our view, 
there are three key issues to resolve9: 
1. Which party procures balancing services from DER? At present, either a DNO or the 
electricity SO might do it, or both. The latter runs the risk of conflict between 
different requirements. 
                                                     
8 The shunt reactor example suggests that the England and Wales TO, at least, preferred not to spend 
money that had not already been allowed even though it might still have been added to the asset 
base in the next price control if it could be shown that the assets were not stranded. In other words, 
the apparent network owner incentive to maximise the size of the asset base is perhaps not as strong 
as some commentators have suggested. 
9 For further discussion see Bell, K. and Gill, S. (2018) Delivering a highly distributed electricity system: 
Technical, regulatory and policy challenges. Energy Policy 113: 765-777. Ongoing UKERC research is 
ĂůƐŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ‘ĂƌĐŚĞƚǇƉĞƐ ?ŽĨƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŽƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ
on the electricity system that it is intended to publish in the coming weeks. 
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2. What information is required to be exchanged between parties in different 
institutional models, and what information and communication system investment is 
required to deliver it? 
3. What benefits (or risks) may be expected to come from having multiple parties 
involved in operation of the system? For example, would different distribution 
systems operators (DSOs) in different areas, each interacting with the transmission 
system operator, provide scope for innovation that would be lost if one party had 
absolute control? 
Ideally, in order to enhance confidence that an economic and efficient whole electricity 
system business plan can be identified and delivered, the questions being addressed within 
Open Networks would have been resolved before the RIIO-2 price controls are set. 
Realistically, this will not be possible. However, the adverse consequences of this should be 
reduced by having a 5-year RIIO-2 period instead of an 8 year period with the major impacts 
 W not least those arising from the potential for significant growth in electricity demand  W 
probably not occurring before a putative RIIO-3 period. 
 
Uncertainty 
We have noted in our answer to Q1 that price control settlements are subject to significant 
uncertainty. This has always been the case, not least in respect of: 
x the number, size and location of generation openings and closures; 
x the need for replacement of aged assets; and 
x  ‘ƵŶŝƚĐŽƐƚƐ ?ŽĨĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇof new network assets. 
Except in respect of individual locations and whether demand will grow enough to trigger the 
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂĚĞŵĂŶĚŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĚĞŵĂŶĚgrowth 
has not been a significant factor in the liberalised electricity industry. However, that is likely 
to change. Carbon budgets set by the Committee on Climate Change suggest that the 
decarbonisation of space and water heating, industrial processes and transport should begin 
in earnest in the next decade. How quickly it will happen and what form it will take are 
currently uncertain but will have a major influence on demand for electricity as well as on 
generation capacity. 
In one respect, uncertainty of the generation background is less than in the past: although 
the associated generation capacity is still not guaranteed to be delivered, central contracting 
of generation for four or more years ahead gives a clearer basis for transmission network 
planning than in the past. The main examples of this are the capacity market and contracts 
for difference for low carbon generation. There seems to be confidence within much of the 
renewables sector that  ‘ƐƵďƐŝĚǇ-ĨƌĞĞ ?ƌĞŶĞǁĂďůĞƐcan be achieved though it is also argued 
that long-term income uncertainty still means that some form of centralised long-term 
contracting would provide significant benefits in terms of reduced cost of capital. Such 
contracting would help to provide signals for network development that would otherwise 
depend  W as in the past  W on knowledge gained from generation connection applications. 
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Q4. Do you agree with our minded-to position to retain the current start dates for the 
electricity transmission and electricity distribution price controls, and not align them? 
Ideally, the dates would be aligned as interactions between the respective investment plans 
could be addressed (see our points above on such interactions). However, we recognise the 
practical difficulties not only for Ofgem to assess the respective plans but also for 
stakeholders to review them all at the same time and engage in the consultation process. 
 
 
 
 
Y ? ?/ŶĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ǁŚŽůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?ǁŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚǁĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞZ//K-2 period, and 
what other areas should we consider in the longer-term? 
- Are there any implementation limits to this definition? 
dŚĞ ‘ǁŚŽůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?has a broad definition. UKERC uses a definition that includes all energy 
sources, networks and end uses. It also includes technical, economic, environmental, policy 
and social aspects of energy systems  W as well as the interaction between energy systems and 
related systems (e.g. ecosystems and the economy). 
Clearly, RIIO cannot address the full scope of this definition. However, it illustrates the need 
to take into account the wider context in making decisions about network regulation. This 
includes interactions between networks and other parts of the energy system, and the need 
for networks to facilitate the transition to a low carbon energy system and economy. 
Sustainability First have called for the RIIO-2 framework to include a new over-arching low 
carbon incentive, which merits serious consideration10. This would not be straightforward to 
implement, but Sustainability First also provide some useful discussion of the practicalities. 
We suggest that Ofgem work with BEIS and wider stakeholders to give further consideration 
to this proposal.  
The shift towards a low carbon energy system that is already underway is the principle 
reason that we may need for such an approach. There are already interactions between key 
energy vectors  W gas and electricity. It is not yet clear how heat and transport will be 
decarbonised, but electric vehicles are gaining in popularity and will present major challenges 
in respect of electricity system infrastructure if adoption levels start to increase rapidly, 
particularly in respect of network capacity. 
In our view, one key to development of the future energy system will be how energy users 
are encouraged to make choices that help to reduce the total costs of the transition towards 
a decarbonised energy system. Central to that would seem to be the articulation of 
 ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ?ƉƌŝĐĞƐŝŐŶĂůƐ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚŽ ŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚ ?ŽĨĐŽƐƚ ? ?To inform 
development of the whole energy system, these should be consistent and accurate across 
different energy vectors, including hot water in heat networks.  
                                                     
10 Sustainability First (2018) A Low Carbon Incentive in RIIO-2. Discussion Paper. 
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We understand that Ofgem, among others, has started some work on new network access 
and pricing arrangements for electricity. There are a number of difficult issues to resolve so it 
is very unlikely that a new set arrangements will be ready for the RIIO-2 period. It should, 
however, be regarded as a priority for implementation after RIIO-2. 
Among the choices for how to design price signals are the spatial and temporal granularity 
and what influences on cost are taken into account. In principle, they ought to lead to the 
 ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ůĞǀĞůŽĨďŽƚŚŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĂŶĚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇďĞŝŶŐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŵŽƌĞŽƌůĞƐƐ
ƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƉůĂĐĞƐ ? ? However:  
1. the signals can be difficult to interpret, especially if they vary significantly hour by 
hour; 
2. not every actor has the scope to respond to signals and make a different choice in 
respect of time or place of electricity use or production. 
A price signal will be useful if an actor has some flexibility (in terms of time of use or 
production of energy or the location) and the actor is able to be informed by the signal such 
that it influences the choices they make.  
Current spatial and temporal dimensions of electricity price signals are neither clear nor 
consistent across different voltage levels and reform is well over-due. However, care should 
be taken that new arrangements are not seen as penal, especially in respect of the smallest 
users. This is likely to require some degree of compromise in the arrangements between 
social acceptability and economic optimality. As well as allowing network users to make 
informed choices, the choices they make  W if confidence can be gained in the level of 
continued user commitment (while still giving them flexibility)  W will represent important 
signals to the network licensees in respect of the ongoing need for network capacity. 
 
System Operator price control 
Y ? ?ŽǇŽƵĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƌǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚEĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƌŝĚ ?Ɛelectricity SO price control should be 
separated from its TO price control? 
KĨŐĞŵ ?Ɛstated ambition is to extend competition in the provision of transmission network 
assets beyond the tendering exercises that are currently carried out for the delivery of 
equipment, construction and commissioning, to a given specification to competitive 
assessment that, we suppose, includes also design and maintenance. If this ambition is to be 
ĨƵůĨŝůůĞĚ ?ŝƚǁŝůůďĞŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƚŚĂƚEĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƌŝĚ ?ƐdKďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŝƐŶŽƚƉƌŝǀǇƚŽ any information 
that is not available to potential TO competitors. This is the primary rational for a separation 
between TO and SO business activities, including separate price controls. However, as we 
note in our answer to Q3, the separation between ownership and operation gives rise to 
problems and tensions of its own. 
 
Q7. Do you agree that we should be considering alternative remuneration models for the 
electricity SO? 
- If so, do you have any proposals for the types of models we should be considering? 
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Although the electricity system operator (ESO) has a much smaller asset base than that of the 
network owners, it is not negligible. In particular, much capital is tied up in its main and 
emergency control centres and the associated information and communication systems. The 
^K ?Ɛ main role is in managing around £1 billion per annum of balancing service costs, all of 
which are incurred through contracts with various other industry actors. 
The Balancing Service Incentive Scheme (BSIS) has been in place for some years. Although 
history shows that National Grid has mostly been a winner under the scheme, it could also be 
argued  W through perhaps difficult to prove in the absence of a counterfactual  W that it has 
been successful in keeping total balancing service costs down.  
The costs incurred in balancing the system are predominantly a function of decisions made 
by actors other than the ESO, in particular the generators and the TOs but also the DNOs. As 
was discussed in our answer to Q3, it seems that the new network assets that the ESO 
believes are necessary are not always delivered. Meanwhile, the changing generation mix 
suggests that balancing service costs will grow as they become more important on a system 
increasingly dominated by renewables, with the provision of such services becoming more 
significant sources of income in an energy market dominated by generators with low short-
run costs.  
tĞŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚKĨŐĞŵŝƐ “driving the ESO to take a more active approach to managing the 
energy transition and to supporting system planning (and whole system outcomes), which is 
one of the core enduring roles we have identified for it. Furthermore, as we are seeking to 
promote the role of competition in networks (and more widely), we expect the ESO to support 
this. ?11 As with any regulated entity, there is a challenge in ensuring that it discharges its 
responsibilities in a competent manner. There remains a risk that current regulatory 
arrangements drive a focus on cost minimisation, in particular staff costs12. In our view, this 
has led in the past to a failure to address emerging system issues either quickly enough or 
deeply enough, e.g. in respect of changes to the dynamic behaviour of the system or the 
closure of generation that would contribute to system restoration in the event of a blackout. 
dŚĂƚŝƐŶŽǁĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĂŶĚǁĞǁĞůĐŽŵĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘^ǇƐƚĞŵKƉĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘^ǇƐƚĞŵEĞĞĚƐĂŶĚWƌŽĚƵĐƚ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ?/ƚǁŝůůďĞŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚǁŽƌŬŝƐ
continued and that National Grid has access to the requisite depth and breadth of expertise. 
In a number of instances, this can be found within the other network licensees; collaboration 
ǁŝůůďĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůǁŚŝůĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĂŶǇďŝĂƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƌŝĚ ?s own TO 
business. The other ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŽŶŐŽŝŶŐŽƉĞƌĂďŝů ƚǇŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ
electricity system should be recognised.   
One question that always arises, for all the network licensees not just the ESO, is what can be 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĚĂǇũŽď ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐƐŚŽuld just get on with and what constitutes 
 ‘ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚ ?ƵŶĚĞƌĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ?
EĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƌŝĚ ?ƐƐǇƐƚĞŵŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚǁĂƐĂƉŽŽƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚ
development to inform innovation. Its focus was on making a return within the 1 or 2-year 
timeframe of BSIS settlements. We welcome the award of a network innovation allowance to 
the ESO and observe that it is now commissioning innovation projects. We discuss innovation 
                                                     
11 Ofgem, RIIO-2 Framework Consultation, March 2018 
12 We discuss the cost of the human resource further in our answer to Q22. 
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below but note that research is required not just to identify and exploit opportunities to 
reduce costs for future consumers  W relative to what they otherwise would have been  W but 
ĂůƐŽƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ ?tŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ^K ?Ɛ ‘ĚĂy 
ũŽď ?Žƌ ‘ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŽƉĞŶƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶďƵƚŝƚŝƐĞƐ ĞŶƚŝĂůƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĚŽŶĞ ? 
Whilst we do not have a specific proposal to ensure that the ESO discharges its growing set of 
responsibilities cost effectively, it might be worth considering the establishment of an SO-
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ‘ŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ'ƌŽƵƉ ?. This would be similar to that proposed by Ofgem for the network 
owners.  
 
Network utilisation, stranding and investment risk 
Q9. What options, within the price control, should be considered further to help protect 
consumers against having to pay for costly assets that may not be needed in the future due to 
changing demand or technology, while ensuring companies meet the reasonable demands for 
network capacity in a changing energy system? 
Ofgem notes in its RIIO-2 framework consultation that itƐĨŽĐƵƐŝƐ “ensuring that network 
companies choose investments that maximise the long-term value for consumers and not 
just short-term profits ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚƚŽ “protect consumers from having to pay for 
costly new investment in network infrastructure that is not used, or needed ? ?tĞĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚ
these general aims, though they are difficult to achieve in practice  W especially given the 
amount of uncertainty about the future evolution of the energy system. We also note that, 
once a revenue stream has been set, the network owners would appear not to be driven 
simply to increase the size of the asset base.   
When designing regulatory arrangements for the future, it is worth reflecting on the past. In 
broad terms, there are two views which have been expressed in recent months: 
1. Costs have come down and performance has improved. 
2. Profits are excessive. 
In our view, both of the above are likely to be true. If the second view suggests that 
regulatory arrangements to date have been less than perfect, care should be taken to ensure 
that any new arrangements continue to achieve the first outcome. Fundamentally, the 
challenge has not changed: how to make sure that the network licensees do what competent 
network utilities should do at least cost.  
One of the most difficult things to assess is the need for asset replacement. Much of the 
existing electricity network asset base is reaching or has reached the end of its financial life. 
 ‘EŽŶ-load relatĞĚ ?ĐĂƉĞǆƌĞƉƌĞsents a large part of a network business plan. The planning of 
asset replacement is difficult and should take account of the condition of the asset, the 
availability of finance, project managers and field staff to effect a replacement, and the need 
for outages. The necessity for outages and the need to maintain a network service in the 
meantime is a constraint that was not faced when the particular section of network was first 
developed. It leads to consideration of bundling of works with other assets that would all 
need the same outage. /ŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƌŝĚ ?Ɛ ‘>ŽŶĚŽŶWŽǁĞƌdƵŶŶĞůƐ ?
development, it entailed an investment in additional network capacity prior to asset 
replacement work in order that outages could be taken without compromising reliability of 
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supply. The condition aspect must be considered alongside the cost of replacement, the 
ongoing cost of maintenance, whether an upgrade to an asset would serve both 
reinforcement and replacement needs, and what the consequences of asset failure would be. 
Given the interactions between asset replacement, outages and network capacity 
enhancement, we are unsure how decision making will be undertaken when there is a clearer 
split between TO and SO and an enhanced role for the SO in capacity planning while the TO, 
presumably, retains responsibility for management of asset health. A further problem is that 
failures to adequately manage asset health, particularly those in critical locations, are likely to 
become apparent only after a number of years. At the very least, we would encourage the 
network licensees to make use of the most up-to-date methods for monitoring asset 
condition, making prognoses about future health and prioritising maintenance, 
refurbishment and replacement works in light of the improvements in network reliability that 
might be realistically be expected from new assets13. However, in enhancing monitoring 
capability, account also needs to be taken of cyber security risks that may only be mitigated 
through replacement of particular assets. 
In its RIIO- ?ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?KĨŐĞŵŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “Ŷew investment agreed through 
RIIO-2 could have an asset life of over 45 years. ?However this is true only in respect of 
 ‘ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ?ĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚĐĂƌƌǇĞŶĞƌŐǇĨƌŽŵŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŽƌƐƚŽĞŶĚƵƐĞƌƐ ?Even then, 
different components of particular primary assets, such as overhead lines or circuit breakers, 
have different lifetimes, some rather shorter than 45 years. The system also depends on 
 ‘ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĨŽƌŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ?ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽů. Secondary assets typically 
have much shorter lives, in many instances due to original equipment ŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞƌƐ ? failure 
to support them beyond a few years. Replacement offers new facilities such as enhanced 
operational flexibility and better information on the condition of primary assets. However, 
inter-operability, reliability and security can be difficult to maintain as technologies develop 
and the threat of cyber attacks on power networks increases. 
tĞǁŽƵůĚƵƌŐĞĐĂƵƚŝŽŶǁŚĞŶĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐŚŽǁ ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƵƚŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚĂŶĚůŝŶŬŝŶŐthis 
to income. The network licensees have limited influence over what network users do; 
although price signals can encourage network users towards different choices and 
behaviours, the network licensees are largely in a position of responding to need, a need that 
changes. It is reasonable that the network licensees should be encouraged to show 
competence in anticipating future needs and how they might change; however, uncertainty 
cannot be completely eliminated. Ofgem draws an analogy with interconnector 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĐĂƉĂŶĚĨůŽŽƌ ?ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚŵĞƌĐŚĂŶƚŽƌ
quasi-merchant interconnector development generally leads to less than the optimal amount 
of network capacity.  
Total elimination of stranded assets or windfall profits is likely to be impossible. Moreover, it 
might be argued that an excessive concern with the risk of stranded assets has led on some 
occasions to excessive costs to consumers through delays to regulatory approval for the 
recovery of major reinforcement costs and high constraint costs in the interim. 
                                                     
13 Some new assets turn out to be less reliable than old ones. 
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In our view, what is required is a clearer understanding of upside and downside risks14, i.e: 
1. what would be the consequence of over-investment in network assets? 
2. what would be consequences of under-investment? 
We believe that it will be important that such an understanding is developed both by the 
network licensees and, because of its role in setting income allowances, by Ofgem. It will also 
lead to a requirement for new planning methods and tools, something that, notwithstanding 
some recent developments, the network licensees have generally been slow to address in the 
past15. As noted in our answer to Q2 ? ‘ůĞĂƐƚƌĞŐƌĞƚ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ16 will be an increasingly important 
approach, though it should be treated with care as results are sensitive to choice of 
scenarios. Either an approach such as management of conditional value at risk should be 
used (in effect, an extension of least regret that takes account of the probabilities of the 
outlying scenarios, though these ĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŽƌƐŽŵĞ ‘ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐ
ĂŶĚƌĞǀŝĞǁ ?ŽĨĨƵƚƵƌĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ KĨŐĞŵ ?ƐŵŽŽƚĞĚChallenge 
Group. This might go some way to providing some consistency in the sets of assumptions 
used by the different network licensees17. 
Just as the balance of cost and risk has led to quite different design principles for electricity 
transmission compared with distribution, an assessment of upside and downside risks is likely 
to lead to a slightly different regulatory treatment of transmission and distribution. The radial 
nature of distribution networks and the smaller size of groups connected via each circuit 
mean that the impacts of failures are not as large as they might be at a transmission level. 
Uncertainty in demand growth might be managed in the shorter-term on distribution 
networks by the use of temporary storage facilities or small amounts of temporary 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƵŶƚŝůĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝƐŐĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚ
ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ? ? 
End-use energy efficiency 
Q10. In light of future challenges such as the decarbonisation of heat, what should be the role 
of network companies, including SOs, in encouraging a reduction in energy use by consumers 
in order to reduce future investment in energy networks? 
- What could the potential scale of this impact be? 
                                                     
14 A further question is which parties are best placed to bear and manage different risks. In particular, 
are they best borne by network licensees and their shareholders, or should they be, in some way, 
socialised. 
15 For further discussion, see K Bell (2015) Methods and Tools for Planning the Future Power System: 
Issues and Priorities The IET and K Bell, J Sprooten, A Vergnol and W Bukhsh (2018) Managing risk: 
recommendations for new methods in system development planning. Paper C1-301, CIGRE Session 
2018, Paris. 
16 /ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ůĞĂƐƚƌĞŐƌĞƚ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶ ‘ŶŽƌĞŐƌĞƚ ? ?
17 ƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?EĂƚŝŽŶĂů'ƌŝĚ ?Ɛ “&ƵƚƵƌĞŶĞƌŐǇ^ĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ ? ?&^ ?have a significant influence over these 
assumptions. We understand that many of the network licensees are starting from the FES when 
developing their own business plans. However, it should also be noted that the FES include 
insufficient detail to fully inform network business planning. 
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Network companies do not have a great deal of influence on end use energy demand. 
However, given the right incentives, system operators (especially future DSOs) could 
indirectly influence the level of demand through incentives for system balancing at least cost. 
As discussed in our answer to Q5 above, we support consideration of a low carbon incentive 
within RIIO-2. That would reinforce the incentive for network companies or system operators 
to use a whole systems approach that is aligned with achievement of UK climate change 
targets. Such an approach includes consideration of demand side flexibility  W and potentially 
reduction  W as part of a least cost approach to meet these targets. 
Driving innovation and efficiency 
Innovation 
Q11. Do you agree with our proposal to retain dedicated innovation funding, limited to 
innovation projects which might not otherwise be delivered under the core RIIO-2 framework? 
Network licensees are unlikely to invest in innovation  W or research and development in 
general  W if it does not deliver benefits to the company within a price control period. As we 
explain below, innovation entails uncertainties and there are well-known arguments 
associated with the positive externalities associated with innovation that lead to under 
investment from a societal perspective. We therefore support the proposal to retain 
dedicated innovation funding. There may be definitional/allocation questions  W what might a 
ůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞďĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƚŽĚŽŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂůĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ ‘ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?
innovation. However we do not believe that these undermine the fundamental important of 
retaining innovation funding. 
One general principle concerning innovation and its funding is that it involves uncertainty: an 
idea that seems good requires some development to establish that it really is good, or to 
develop it further. If the potential benefits are significant and their realisation is some way 
into the future, it may be reasonable for the risk associated with resolving the uncertainties 
to be socialised in some way, e.g. through tax payers or customers. In addition, innovation 
ƐŚŽƵůĚƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĞŶĞƌŐǇƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚũƵƐƚƚŚĂƚŝŶŽŶĞsector. For 
example, an innovation in the electricity networks sector might result in benefits in the gas 
sector (such as, for example, reduced need for new compressors). This suggests two tests for 
the appropriateness of specific innovation funding for the network licensees: 
1. The benefits (in respect of lower costs to consumers, reliability of supply, or improved 
social acceptability, e.g. safety or environmental impacts) would either:  
a. accrue to another network licensee; or 
b. accrue to the funded licensee only in a future price control period. 
2. The uncertainties are such that some socialisation of risk is appropriate. 
The level of uncertainty and risk associated with innovation is conventionally categorised by 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ ‘dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇZĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ>ĞǀĞůƐ ? ?dZ>Ɛ ? ? However, the standard definition was 
adopted from the defence and aerospace sector and, as a consequence, has a focus on 
technology to the neglect of methods or working practices, and addresses risk in respect of 
costs and successful operation. While some ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ ‘ĨŽƌĨƵůůĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů
ĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ? ? ‘ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůǀŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƚĞŶƐĞĞŵƐƚŽƌĞƋƵŝ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞ ? 
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We would encourage the various parties with a stake in energy sector innovation  W energy 
companies, Ofgem, the research councils, Innovate UK and relevant academics, in particular 
 W to agree:  
a) a revised definition of TRLs  ?Žƌ “ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐůĞǀĞůƐ ?); and  
b) a common approach to which funding sources are appropriate to support work at 
different levels. 
We do not agree wŝƚŚƚŚĞǀŝĞǁŽĨŽŶĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞ ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŝŶKĨŐĞŵ ?ƐZ//K-2 
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĂƚ “after 13 years of access to innovation funding for DNOs, it may 
now be appropriate to re-focus support towards larger-scale, whole-system orientated 
projects ? ?/Ŷ our view, this risks the neglect of important, smaller developments and smaller 
projects concerned with developing knowledge and understanding as pre-requisites to future 
consumer benefits and mitigation of longer-term system risks. It also risks an over-emphasis 
ŽŶ ‘ƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŶ ƚĂďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞďŝŐŶƵŵďĞƌƐĂŶĚ
headlines generated than the learning achieved and shared. 
 
Q12. Do you agree with our three broad areas of reform:  
i) increased alignment of funds to support critical issues associated with the energy 
transition challenges 
ii) greater coordination with wider public sector innovation funding and support and  
iii) increased third party engagement (including potentially exploring direct access to 
RIIO innovation funding)? 
We agree that greater coordination with wider public sector innovation funding and support 
would be of benefit. As noted above in our answer to Q11, we would encourage a revised 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?Žƌ ‘ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐůĞǀĞůƐƚŚĂƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐ the gathering of 
knowledge and understanding through to the establishment of commercial viability. This 
could be used to map the scope of different funding streams. However we would also note 
that different streams can  W and do  W overlap. For example, research council funding can 
support the design, development of technologies or methods, and testing in physical labs, 
ƐŵĂůůƐĐĂůĞ ‘ůŝǀŝŶŐůĂďƐ ?ŽƌŝŶĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ƐŽ ?ǁĞďĞůŝĞǀĞ ?ĐĂŶEĞƚǁŽƌŬ
Innovation Allowance funding. We see no reason why this cannot continue to be so and note 
the potential benefits of leveraged funding. 
Universities in the UK can play a key part in helping energy ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǁ ?
low carbon world. This requires not only individual academics who meet standard university 
performance metrics by publishing learned papers, but also teams capable of helping 
industry navigate the challenges facing them, resolve key uncertainties and adopt 
appropriate innovations. In a context of continually squeezed public spending where the 
research councils are under the same pressures as other public bodies, the support provided 
by the Network Innovation Allowance (NIA) and Network Innovation Competition (NIC) is 
extremely valuable in helping to ensure that academic work is industrially relevant and has 
 ‘ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŽĞŵƉůŽǇƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ? However challenges arise for 
academic groups trying to retain intellectual capacity through short/fixed term contracts. . 
One example of a need for greater coordination therefore lies in investment in building and 
retaining research capacity. This is, in our view, of long-term importance and could be 
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enhanced through more effective coordination of Government and private sector funding 
sources. 
 
Q13. What are the key issues we will need to consider in exploring these options for reform at 
the sector-specific methodology stage, including: 
i) What the critical issues may be in each sector and how we can mitigate the bias 
towards certain types of innovation through focusing on these issues? 
ii) How we can better coordinate any dedicated RIIO innovation funding with wider 
public sector funding and support (including Ofgem initiatives such as the 
Innovation Link and the Regulatory Sandbox)?  
iii) How we can enable increased third-party engagement and what could be the 
potential additional benefits and challenges of providing direct access to third 
parties in light of the future sources of transformative and disruptive innovation? 
tĞĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚKĨŐĞŵƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƌĞůĂƚĞƚŽ “larger volumes of 
consumer data, enabling consumers to shift patterns of demand ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
appropriate for funding to be made available to the sector to maximise the value from data 
and facilitate demand side flexibility. Ofgem also notes a future ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŝŶ “identifying 
those consumers in vulnerable situations ? ?KƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞEKƐ ?ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?
already have a responsibility to develop and maintain a Priority Services Register for people in 
need (that might be more strongly enforced) ?tĞƉƌĞƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?ĞǆƚĞŶĚƐĂůƐŽƚŽŬĞǇŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?ǁĂƚĞƌƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚǁŽƌŬƐĂŶĚ
communication facilities.  
A systematic review of the more than 60 Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF) projects carried 
out on behalf of UKERC and HubNet18 found that few LCNF projects addressed the potential 
for distribution connected resources to help manage the wider electricity system in respect, 
for example, of whole system balancing, with relatively little attention to novel methods, 
working practices or commercial arrangements. DNOs ? focus in LCNF projects was 
predominately on equipment which was new to them. 
Focusing ůĞƐƐŽŶďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐƚŽŶĞƚǁŽƌŬůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ?ŽǁŶĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŽŶĞŶĞƌŐǇƵƐĞƌƐĂƐ
a whole may help to mitigate some of the biases that Ofgem perceives and help to ensure 
ŵŽƌĞŽĨĂ ‘ǁŚŽůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ?As we have already noted, we believe there is a need to 
address risks not only possible opportunities. 
In respect of better coordination of RIIO innovation funding, see our answers to Q11 and 
Q12. 
/ŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƵƉĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽŶĞƚǁŽƌŬůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ?ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ?ŵŽŶĞǇƚŽƉĂǇĨŽƌǁŽƌk both 
proposed and undertaken by 3rd parties promises to widen the scope for innovation. 
However, proposals should be assessed with a critical eye as, in many cases, the proposers 
may lack knowledge of quite what the network challenges really are or be motivated by a 
 ‘ƋƵŝĐŬďƵĐŬ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨůŽŶŐĞƌ-term energy system or consumer benefits.   
                                                     
18 Damien Frame, Keith Bell and Stephen McArthur, A Review and Synthesis of the Outcomes from Low 
Carbon Networks Fund Projects, UKERC/HubNet, August 2016. 
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It should be noted that 3rd parties are already heavily involved in network innovation 
projects. However, we have some concerns about the way they sometimes seem to be 
engaged. /ŶŶŽǀĂƚŽƌƐ ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇŝƐƚŚĞŝƌŝĚĞĂƐ ?ĨŽƌŵĞĚĂƐŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ and the 
associated intellectual property rights (IPR). They depend both on other people picking up 
their ideas and on gaining some value from them themselves in order to help to fund their 
continued creative and developmental work. The network licensees are regulated and, for 
the most part, are monopolies whose activities are closely scrutinised by Ofgem to ensure 
ǀĂůƵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ?ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ?ďŽƚŚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?KĨŐĞŵŚĂƐĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ
permissible for ůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ?ŵŽŶĞǇƚŽďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĨƵŶĚůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
the Network Innovation Allowance (NIA) and Network Innovation Competition (NIC), subject 
ƚŽĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? “One of the purposes of the NIA is to allow learning 
to be shared amongst Network Licensees. The NIA Project must develop new learning that can 
be applied by Relevant Network Licensees. ?19 /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? “We recognise that the Projects 
financed by the NIA may create IPR either for the Funding Licensee or for any Project Partners 
(whether for one, both or jointly) ?ĂŶĚ “Network Licensees must ensure that their IPR 
arrangements allow for the Dissemination of knowledge in respect of a Project. This 
knowledge includes the knowledge necessary to reproduce or simulate the outcome of a 
Project.  Q/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨ/WZǁŽƵůĚďĞĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞĚŝŶWƌŽũĞĐƚ
Progress Information, only sufficient information to enable others to identify whether the IPR 
ŝƐŽĨƵƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŵ ? Q&ŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ/WZǁŝƚŚŝŶŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůWƌŽĚƵĐƚƐŝƐŶŽƚĚĞemed Relevant 
Foreground IPR. However, these must be made available for purchase by Network Licensees 
ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞWƌŽũĞĐƚ ? QĂĐŚWĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐŚĂůůŽǁŶĂůů&ŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ/WZƚŚĂƚŝƚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚůǇ
creates as part of the Project. Where Foreground IPR is created jointly, it may be owned in 
shares that are in proportion to the funding and work done in its creation ? ? 
We have become aware that some network licensees are adopting the following practices in 
respect of innovation projects: 
a) insisting that all Foreground IPR in an innovation project is fully and exclusively owned 
by the network licensee; 
b) asking third parties to volunteer their ideas but then commissioning others to take 
them forward. 
The explanation given to us of practice (a) has been that it is needed in order that the 
network licensee can disseminate the learning. It seems to us that such a position is incorrect 
given the various stipulations of the NIA governance arrangements summarised above. 
Moreover, at least in respect of many universities, it is common practice for the university to 
own any Foreground IP independently developed or to institute shared ownership, to offer a 
free licence to the client to use the ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŐround IP developed in the project, and 
to actively promote dissemination of knowledge.  
We are not clear on how widespread the above practices are but both of them are likely to 
act as deterrents to 3rd parties volunteering to become involved with network licensees or to 
offer their ideas. 
 
                                                     
19 Ofgem, Electricity Network Innovation Allowance Governance Document version 3.0, 2017. 
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Q14. What form could the innovation funding take. 
- What would be the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches? 
The UKERC/HubNet LCNF review found that, in a number of cases, there appears to have 
been poor initial design of experiments, with a failure to clearly state what information is 
ƐŽƵŐŚƚĂŶĚƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞƌŽďƵƐƚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶŝƚ ?dŚŝƐŵĂǇďĞĚƵĞƚŽEKƐ ?ŝŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞup 
to that point with the specification, management and execution of research, development 
and demonstration (RD&D) projects. Of 63 projects reviewed, 30 had a university as a 
ĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ĂŬĞǇĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞŽŶƚŚĞ
framing, testing and reporting of research, but it appears this may not have always been 
utilised effectively.  
Successful delivery criteria linked to a recoverable funding contribution, as applied in the 
LCNF arrangements, may be an appropriate method of incentivising performance in learning 
outputs in regulated industries; however, any reward criteria must be focussed on the quality 
of learning outputs not just their delivery20. A framework and good practice guide for 
shaping, capturing and assessing the learning outputs of funded innovation projects is, we 
believe, essential and ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚKĨŐĞŵ ?ƐElectricity Network Innovation 
Allowance Governance Document ŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐ “Required Project Progress Information ? ?ŝƚŝƐŽƵƌ
impression that the stipulations are not being clearly or consistently followed. Moreover, 
Ofgem guidance says little about design of experiments or trials in which stakeholders can 
have confidence in respect of generation of learning and the associated evidence. 
A framework should support both assessment of projects at the bid stage and ongoing 
evaluation of success, and should be oriented towards the following: are projects targeting 
key uncertainties with an appropriate set of planned experiments and, once funded, are they 
producing high quality learning that moves the knowledge of the sector forward? And, if core 
business deployment is not yet fully proven, can the knowledge generated and shared be 
easily built on by subsequent innovation projects?21 
 
Q15. How can we further encourage the transition of innovation to BAU in the RIIO-2 period? 
How can we develop our approach to the monitoring and reporting of benefits arising from 
innovation? 
Fundamentally, the network licence conditions ƐŚŽƵůĚĚƌŝǀĞ ‘ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚĂŶƐǁĞƌ ? ?Knce an 
innovation has been tested and shown to be commercially viable, failure to adopt the 
innovation when conditions arise that would make use of it could be a breach of the licence. 
Of course, the difficulty would lie in proving such a breach. 
The UKERC/HubNet review of LCNF developed a framework for evaluating innovation 
adoption readiness. This could provide a useful component of ongoing formal evaluation of 
                                                     
20 For further discussion, see &ƌĂŵĞĞƚĂů ? “Innovation in regulated electricity distribution networks: A 
review of the effectiveness of Great Britain's Low Carbon Networks Fund ? ?ŶĞƌŐǇWŽůŝĐǇ ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
21 /ŶŽƵƌǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞE ?Ɛ ‘^ŵĂƌƚĞƌEĞƚǁŽƌŬƐWŽƌƚĂů ?ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĂǀĞƌǇŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚƉůĂƚĨorm for 
dissemination. It could be much improved in respect of, for example, tagging of projects via an 
improved set of keywords, access to data, summaries of key conclusions (with citation of the 
supporting evidence and where to find it) and listing of project partners. 
 
22 
ƚŚĞ ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ŽĨŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ?/ƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĞŶŚĂ ĐĞĚƚŽĂůůŽǁĨŽƌŵĂůƐĞůĨ-assessment of 
an innovation's readiness to be deployed when required, and the required progression in 
respect of reduction of uncertainty. It could be accompanied by an in-depth discussion of the 
supporting evidence produced by the project. For projects with a positive score, a description 
of the expected pathway towards deployment should be ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ?dŚŝƐ ‘ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶ
ƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐƉĂƚŚǁĂǇ ?ĐŽƵůĚƚŚĞŶďĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĞǆƉĞƌƚ scrutiny and would support 
ongoing knowledge capture, strategy development, and appropriate design of future 
innovation projects. 
Whether it is around the adoption of innovative solutions or the use of more established 
methods or technologies, it has will continue to be a challenge for the regulator to establish if 
a network licensee is discharging its duties competently. As far as we are aware, to date, the 
only attempt that has been made has been as part of a price control review in which past 
capital expenditure has been assessed with a view to deciding whether particular items can 
be added to the asset base. One approach that might (a) provide enhanced information and 
(b) spread the assessment workload would be a random audit approach. This would be 
analogous to financial audits in which randomly selected transactions are followed through 
all stages. Where these closely scrutinised transactions are shown to have been treated 
correctly, confidence can be gained that business processes are appropriate and that the 
majority of accounts are correct. In the network licensee audit analogy, randomly selected 
investments would be assessed in detail in terms of their origin, analysis, business case 
development, evaluation, final decision and implementation. 
Competition 
Q16. Do you agree with our proposal to extend the role of competition across the sectors 
(electricity and gas, transmission and distribution)? 
- What are the trade-offs that will need to be considered in designing the most efficient 
competitions? 
The main evidence usually cited in support of competitively awarded network development 
and ownership contracts is the experience of Offshore Transmission Owners (OFTOs). When 
claiming specific savings, Ofgem should state clearly what these savings are relative to and 
how any counterfactual was formed. 
While there may well be some consumer benefits to come from extended competition in the 
provision of electricity and gas network capacity, we would counsel against reading too much 
into the apparent evidence from OFTOs: 
x None of the OFTOs has actually designed and built anything yet.  
o The OFTOs have acquired assets that were commissioned and initially financed 
by the generation developers. 
x OFTOs own and operate connections to the main interconnected transmission 
systems (MITS) and not any assets within the MITS.  
o The costs and benefits of different configurations of connections to the MITS 
are relatively easily defined, especially once a connection design standard as 
expressed in the Security and Quality of Supply Standard (SQSS) has been set. 
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x As far as we understand it, the OFTO personnel responsible for maintenance of the 
assets have been inherited from the generation developers. 
OFTOs may have given rise to more innovative and more cost-effective maintenance 
practices than the established transmission licensees. However it the OFTO arrangement also 
permits benefits that may come from  ‘financial engineering ? rather than physical engineering. 
The generation developers can raise finance for development of the connection to the MITS 
knowing that they can sell it on almost immediately to another party, an OFTO. The OFTO 
knows that its risk is strictly limited by the floor of the cap and floor income model and so can 
raise finance quite cheaply. We are not clear on the extent to which they are exposed to the 
main risk  W cable failure entailing unavailability of the connection for many months  W and how 
this compares with that faced by the established, regulated TOs in respect of onshore 
connections. 
The difficulties we highlighted in answers to earlier questions associated with separation of 
network ownership from system operation would also arise in respect of CATOs. 
 
Q18. What could the potential models be for early stage competitions (for design or technical 
solutions)? 
- What are the key challenges in the implementation of such models, and how might we 
overcome them? 
Whatever clever ideas are used in maintaining an asset, the biggest savings come from not 
needing it in the first place, whilst the biggest benefits come from the asset being available. It 
seems to us that the main potential benefit of the competition envisaged by Ofgem is to 
provide scope for genuine innovation in respect of the design of new electricity network 
capacity, e.g. to consider different technologies or different routes, such as taking a Western 
Isles connection along the sea bed to the south of Scotland rather than across the shortest 
stretch of water and across land to somewhere in the north. However, the winning bidder 
would be required to present a business case addressing, at least, whole electricity system 
benefits and to take on the planning consents risks. It should also be recognised that 
considerable work would be needed from each and every bidder to assess the different 
options and develop a case for the preferred one, effort that would be priced into a bid. 
Moreover, the capability of consultants to undertake this and to assess whole electricity 
system benefits will be limited relative to that of the network licensees, ǁŚŽƐĞ ‘ĚĂǇũŽď ?ŝƐƚŽ
know their network and its place in the wider system.  
The potential consumer benefits of a late model will be much less, simply as a consequence 
of the design having been largely set. The network licensees go out to tender, for 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚ ŽǁŚŝĐŚĂ ‘ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞůǇĂǁĂƌded 
ƚƌĂŶƐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽǁŶĞƌ ? (CATO) can achieve further savings is open to question. For example, as 
we understand it, one of the constraints, at least in the recent past, comes from a set of 
standard technical specifications, largely inherited from CEGB days and tending to be quite 
specific to Great Britain and therefore sometimes requiring bespoke modifications of 
equipment available on the global market. 
The contracting out of detailed design, construction, commissioning and maintenance of 
transmission network assets to a given, quite high level functional specification has been 
tried before by National Grid  W ƚŚĞ “ůůŝĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?KƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?
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we would therefore advise Ofgem to delve deeply into learning why this was the case before 
committing to any particular CATO model. 
 
Simplifying the price controls 
Our approach to setting outputs 
Q19. What views do you have on our proposed approach to specifying outputs and setting 
incentives? 
- When might relative or absolute targets for output delivery incentives be appropriate? 
- What impact would automatically resetting targets for output delivery incentives 
during a price control have? Which outputs might best suit this approach? 
We believe that the principle of rewarding  W or penalising  W the network licensees according 
to their performance in delivering core services to network users is a good one. However, the 
devil is in the detail of quite how it is done. There are factors that influence measured 
outputs that are genuinely outside their control, and there will be random variations from 
one year to another.  
Our approach to setting cost allowances 
Q20. What views do you have on our general approach to setting cost allowances? 
As has been noted by many, including Ofgem and by us in our answers to earlier questions, 
there is considerable uncertainty around both the future need for network investment and 
how much it will cost to deliver. Generation connections and closures are outside the control 
of the network licensees and the demand for electricity and gas will undoubtedly change in 
the next decade or two. New methods and technologies, such as making use of the flexibility 
afforded by power electronics or offered from the demand side, promise to reduce the need 
for conventional primary assets though they also present new operational challenges. 
Effective utilisation of flexibility depends on monitoring, control and coordination and this 
depends on assets that become obsolete quickly and, if not appropriately designed and 
managed, are vulnerable to cyber-attack. There is also considerable variation in the cost of 
particular assets, in respect of land, civil works, the cost of design and commissioning 
personnel, and the cost of equipment. The last of these is in turn affected by the state of the 
global market, exchange rates and commodity prices. 
In principle, the impact of at least some of these uncertainties on ƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬůŝĐĞŶƐĞĞƐ ?
ability to meet their licence conditions within a set revenue stream ought to be manageable 
by income adjustment factors. Of course, this is conditional on making the factors dependent 
on the right things and assigning the right size to them. 
Given enough relevant data, statistical analysis would reveal interdependencies and 
correlations between factors, such as those influencing prices of particular items of 
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equipment22. Access to relevant data is clearly critical; however, much of it is not published. 
Ofgem may have better scope to access this than others. 
 
Q22. What impact would resetting cost allowances based on actual cost performance (eg 
benchmarked to the average, upper quartile or best performer) during a price control have? 
Which cost categories might best suit this approach? 
We offer no particular views on this question in general but highlight one specific issue that 
has arisen in the past in relation to measurement of network licensees relative to each other. 
It has been asserted, for example by network licensees to trades unions representing their 
staff, that, due to the revenue constraints set by Ofgem, pay settlements should be at or 
around the median for the sector. This neglects the fact that there would normally be a 
spread, for all sorts of reasons. If every company paid at the median, they would all be paying 
the same. In our view, a spread is reasonable as it might be more difficult to recruit and 
retain staff in some locations than in others; companies should also be free to choose what 
emphasis they wish to place on high levels of skills and what that means for the business as a 
whole.  
Our understanding, e.g. via the IET Power Academy, is that the electricity sector, in particular, 
still finds it quite difficult to attract enough engineers of sufficient calibre. This seems to be 
applicable across the sector from fitters, technicians and Senior Authorised Persons to 
Chartered Engineers and engineering managers. Much of that difficulty can be traced to the 
challenge of attracting young people to study engineering and pursue it as a career, a 
challenge that is especially acute in respect of young women. Many companies have 
depended on recruits from outside the UK, especially from elsewhere in the European Union. 
We therefore highlight the significant challenge to recruitment and retention that is likely to 
be faced when the UK withdraws from the EU. Two broad outcomes might be expected to 
arise: skills found within the body of recruits would generally be lower, raising risks for 
business activities that might only be mitigated by increased expenditure on training and 
education by the businesses themselves; or higher salaries will need to be offered to attract 
those who already have the required knowledge and skills. 
 
Annual reports/reporting 
Q32. How can we make the annual reports easier for stakeholders to understand and more 
meaningful to use? 
One of the most important performance metrics for the DNOs is the reliability of supply to 
ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐĂƐƋƵĂŶƚŝĨŝĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌŵŝŶƵƚĞƐůŽƐƚ ? ?D> ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?
                                                     
22 An example of a similar approach used to try to understand influences on the capital cost of wind 
ĨĂƌŵƐŝƐ ?DĐDŝůůĂŶĂŶĚ' ?Ƶůƚ ? “Wind farm capital cost regression model for accurate life cycle cost 
estimation ? ?/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐe of Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems (PMAPS), 
Istanbul, 2012. 
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(CI). These are subject to a quality of service incentive. Consolidated, up to date annual 
reports on these metrics for each licence area enable ready comparison of the actual CML 
and CI performance but we believe that it will not be immediately obvious to many 
ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶĂŶĂƉƉĞŶĚŝǆŽĨĂ “Z//K- ?ŶŶƵĂůZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ?/ƚĐŽƵůĚ
be improved by clearer presentation of licensee performance in terms of the service 
delivered to network users, for example: reliability of supply; number of new connection 
facilitated relative to the price control forecast; how quickly connection offers are made and 
how many are accepted; the proportion of the population of different asset types that were 
planned for replacement versus how many have actually been replaced, number of 
frequency and voltage excursions, etc.. 
 
Fair returns and financeability 
Financeability 
Q39. Do you consider the introduction of a revenue floor, to protect the ability of companies 
to service debt, to have merit? 
Aside from times when politicians have responded to major loss of supply events by claiming 
that they are evidence of under-investment by the network companies, we are not aware of 
particular public concern - since liberalisation of the gas and electricity supply industries -
about under-investment in the networks. Rather, some commentators have claimed over-
investment or excessive profits23. In addition, connection applicants sometimes complain 
about delays to connections being completed, or excessive use of system charges. The 
rĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?ĞĐŚŽĞĚŝŶƚŚĞmost recent RIIO-2 consultation, also seem 
to have been over-ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?ĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞƌĞƚƵƌŶƐŽƌĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽŵĞĞƚƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŶĞĞĚƐ ?/ƚŝƐƌŝŐŚƚ
ƚŚĂƚKĨŐĞŵƐĞĞŬƐƚŽƐĂĨĞŐƵĂƌĚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƐ ? 
ThĞƌĞŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ “ƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƚŚĞǇ ?ǁŚĞŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ
licensees complain about squeezed returns but it seems to us that there is a tone to the 
ŝŶŝƚŝĂůƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽKĨŐĞŵ ?Ɛ ‘ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ-ƉƌŽǆǇ ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĨŽƌ,ŝŶŬůĞǇWŽŝŶƚ WSeabank and 
what it augurs for the RIIO-2 settlements that seems different. It may be necessary, for the 
first time, to consider the possibility of under-investment due to decisions by the network 
licensees, many of which are part of companies that operate in many different markets, to 
spend their money elsewhere. As we noted in our answer to Q9, the consequences of both 
over-investment and under-investment should be considered by both the network licensees 
and Ofgem. Over-investment would have unwelcome impaĐƚƐŽŶĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?ďŝůůƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌ-
investment might lead to excessive constraint costs, put security of supply at risk or delay the 
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞĐĂƌďŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? 
 
                                                     
23 For example, Helm, D (2017) Cost of Energy Review. Report for the Department of Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy. 
